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ARGUMENT 
Judging by Traco's opening brief and ComtroPs opposing brief, it's not surprising 
the parties have arrived at this point in the litigation—they don't appear to be speaking 
the same language. Traco's brief emphasizes the importance of following the contract 
language and correct legal damage rules in measuring Comtrol's actual damages. 
Comtrol's brief largely ignores these arguments, and instead relies on cases allowing a 
reasonable approximation of damages where damages are otherwise difficult to ascertain 
from a factual standpoint (such as lost profits cases). 
In taking this approach, Comtrol has failed to refute the legal arguments and 
authorities justifying reversal of the court of appeals' decision. Moreover, Comtrol has 
perhaps unwittingly underscored the court of appeals' erroneous acceptance of the wrong 
method for measuring damages in this case. 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY ACCEPTED THE TRIAL 
COURT'S APPLICATION OF THE WRONG METHOD FOR 
MEASURING DAMAGES. 
A, ComtroPs Arguments Regarding Marshaling and the Sufficiency of the 
Evidence Do Not Apply, 
Comtrol devotes much of its brief to arguing that sufficient evidence was 
presented to sustain the damages award as a factual matter, and that Traco was required to 
marshal that evidence in challenging the award. Comtrol's arguments are misdirected, 
since, as demonstrated in Traco's opening brief, the fundamental issue is whether the trial 
court used the right method for measuring damages before beginning its factual 
computation. 
Comtrol has failed to respond to the ample case law requiring the trial court to 
select the correct measure of damages as a legal matter. Issues of factual sufficiency, 
requiring the marshaling of evidence on appeal, arise only after the correct damages ' 
measure is determined. See, e.g., Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 
2007 UT 17, f 25, 156 P.3d 782; Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 
99, Tf 14, 61 P.3d 1009. The court of appeals erred in requiring Traco to marshal the 
evidence when Traco challenged the trial court's selection of the wrong method to 
measure damages in the first place. 
Comtrol relies on cases suggesting that damages need only be proved with 
reasonable certainty if the fact of damage is sufficiently shown. Those cases are 
inapposite since the trial court failed to measure damages by the actual cost method as 
required by the parties' contract and Utah case law. Moreover, better evidence of 
Comtrol5s actual damages was readily available. 
Judge McHugh aptly distinguished Kilpatrick v. Wiley Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 
107, 37 P.3d 1130; and Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981), for example, since in 
those cases the evidence of damages for lost profits of a new business and for the value of 
a nonexistent well, respectively, was sparse, if not completely unavailable. Traco Steel 
Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc., 2007 UT App. 407, f 57 (J. McHugh, dissenting). 
By contrast, here Comtrol easily could have produced W-2's, paycheck stubs, or 
other payroll records showing the respective hourly rates and labor burden of its various 
employees who worked on the Weber State and UVSC projects. Armed with that readily 
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available evidence, the trial court then could have weighed testimonial evidence of 
average labor rates, along with other evidence, and made an accurate determination of 
Comtrors actual labor costs. 
Comtrol insists it provided actual labor cost evidence in the form of weekly time 
cards describing work performed and hours expended to complete Traco's work. {See 
Respondent's Brief at 19, Addendum B.) But the time cards support only half of the 
labor cost equation, since Comtrol applied a single, average regional labor rate (derived 
from the R.S. Means catalog) to the hours expended by all employees, regardless of actual 
compensation levels. 
In a case cited by Comtrol, Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 
1983), this Court held: 
The certainty requirement is met as to the amount of lost profits if there is 
sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to make a reasonable 
approximation. . . . What constitutes such an approximation will vary with 
the circumstances. Greater accuracy is required in cases where highly 
probative evidence is easy to obtain than in cases where such evidence is 
unavailable... . 
Id. at 1166 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
Applying that rationale here, Comtrol was required to meet its initial burden of 
proving actual costs—not only by time cards describing hours spent, but by the available 
and highly probative payroll records evidencing the hourly rates to be applied to such 
hours. The court should have considered the available payroll records so that damages 
could be calculated with greater accuracy using the actual cost method. Traco Steel 
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Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol Inc., 2007 UT App. 407, \ 58 (J. McHugh, dissenting) ("in a 
case such as this, where the costs have already been incurred, Comtrol should have 
provided the best records available to prove the actual costs it incurred in completing 
Traco's work"). 
B. The Trial Court Incorrectly Began Its Damages Analysis with the R.S. 
Means-Based Average Regional Labor Rate, 
Comtrol contends the trial court "rejected" the R.S. Means average regional labor 
rate and instead determined Comtrol's damages by weighing the "extensive" evidence of 
"the actual costs Comtrol paid to perform Traco's unfinished work." (Respondent's Brief 
at 17-18.) However, Comtrol implicitly concedes the trial court began its analysis with 
the R.S. Means rate—the only rate Comtrol presented to support its calculation of the 
labor costs necessary for its employees to complete the work. And the trial court clearly 
used that rate in determining ComtroPs "expenses" to complete the work, which the court 
then reduced as unreasonable. {See Finding of Fact Nos. 24, 45, R. at 905-06, 912.) 
The problems associated with using the R.S. Means rate as an analytical starting 
point are discussed in detail in Traco's opening brief. Comtrol has provided no response 
to that discussion, including the decisions of this Court requiring the correct damages rule 
to be applied before the evidence is weighed to determine the correct damages amount. 
See, e.g., Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, 96 P.3d 893; Lysenko v. 
Sawaya, 2000 UT 58, 7 P.3d 783. 
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C. The R.S. Means Rate Exceeded Comtrol's Actual Costs. 
Comtrol's back charges, as calculated in Defendant's Exhibits 38 and 74 (see 
Addendum A-4 to Traco's opening brief), were based on a labor rate of $50.68 derived 
from the R.S. Means catalog, which Comtrol used for bidding jobs. Comtrol added 10 
percent profit and 10 percent overhead to that rate. (R. at 1049, pp. 960-62.) 
The R.S. Means-based labor rate, in turn, was calculated by combining: (1) a base 
union wage rate (including fringe benefits) averaged over 20 major western U.S. cities for 
structural steelworkers of $32.55; (2) a workers' compensation rate for structural 
steelworkers averaged over 13 western U.S. states of 39.2 percent; and (3) average fixed 
overhead for all trades, including federal and state unemployment, FICA, builder's risk 
insurance costs and public liability costs, of 16.5 percent (which percentage varies from 
state to state and from company to company). (See R. at 1049, pp. 961-62; Defendant's 
Exhibit 79, p. 4 (Addendum A-4 to Traco's opening brief).) Exhibits 38 and 74 apply the 
R.S. Means rate, so derived, across the board to all hours of all employees who worked on 
the Weber State and UVSC projects, irrespective of the employees' actual compensation 
levels. 
Comtrol's brief makes it clear the R.S. Means-based rate exceeded Comtrol's 
actual labor costs. Comtrol admits its employees testified to much lower average hourly 
rates and labor burden than the R.S. Means rate ($20 per hour for non-supervisory 
employees; $30 per hour for superintendents; 35 percent labor burden). (See 
Respondent's Brief at 8, 26-27.) Comtrol also acknowledges testimony that some of the 
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employees who worked on the UVSC and Weber State projects were laborers who were 
normally paid $10 to $15 per hour. (R. at 1050, pp. 1006-09; cf. Respondent's Brief at 9.) 
Consequently, according to the testimony of Comtrol5s own employees, actual 
labor rates (including labor burden) for the employees who worked on the UVSC and 
Weber State projects would be $13.50 for laborers, $27.00 for most employees, and 
$40.50 for superintendents. Although these rates are a far cry from the $50.68 rate 
Comtrol back charged Traco, they are still averages. The actual rates easily could have 
been calculated if Comtrol had produced available payroll records reflecting hourly rates 
paid to each employee, as well as specific labor burden, in meeting Comtrol's burden of 
proving actual costs to complete Traco's work. 
Comtrol relies on the conclusory testimony of its president, Brian Burk, that the 
R.S. Means-derived rate of $50.68 per hour reflected the "true cost to Comtrol." (R. at 
1049, p. 963.) But that testimony directly contradicts Mr. Burk's trial testimony under 
cross-examination, his deposition testimony, and the testimony of other Comtrol 
personnel as to lower average labor costs and labor burden. (R. at 1049, pp. 816-19; R. at 
1050, pp. 1006-09.) 
Comtrol also asserts the higher R.S. Means rate was intended to cover certain 
"hidden costs" such as vehicle usage and consumables—which Comtrol emphasizes for 
the first time on appeal. Presumably these costs were covered in the overhead and profit 
mark-ups Comtrol added to the R.S. Means rate. There is no evidence in the record that 
simply adding the so-called "hidden costs" to Comtrol's average labor rates would yield 
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the higher R.S. Means average regional base rate of $32.55 and average labor burden of 
55.7 percent (39.2 percent average workers' compensation insurance and 16.5 percent 
average fixed overhead).1 
D. The Trial Court Erroneously Concluded Its Damages Analysis with the 
Fair Market Amount to Complete Traco's Work. 
Even though the trial court's Findings of Fact do not mention the R.S. Means rate, 
they make it clear the court used the wrong method for measuring damages. The trial 
court accepted the numbers from Comtrol's damage exhibits, which were based on the 
R.S. Means-derived rate of $50.68 per hour, as Comtrol's claimed expenses to complete 
the work. The court then reduced those numbers as "excessive," "unreasonable," 
"duplicative," and "overstated." (Finding of FactNos. 24, 45, R. at 905-06, 912.) 
But the numbers from Comtrol's exhibits did not reflect Comtrol's actual costs, 
however excessive or unreasonable. They reflected higher average regional labor rates 
for structural steelworkers. (Defendant's Exhibit 79, p. 4 (Addendum A-4 to Traco's 
opening brief).) The court viewed Comtrol's "expenses" so calculated as excessive, so it 
Interestingly, the $50.68 R.S. Means-based rate Comtrol used to back 
charge Traco exceeded the $35.00 hourly rate Comtrol back charged another 
subcontractor on the UVSC project. (R. at 1050, pp. 1004-05; Plaintiffs Exhibit 112.) 
It's fair to assume the $35.00 rate covered Comtrol's wages, labor burden, and purported 
"hidden costs." Even Comtrol's alleged average base labor rate for most 
employees—which was much lower than the R.S. Means rate—exceeded the $18.00 per 
hour rate Comtrol paid its subcontractor, Gorden Johansen, who was a "very qualified 
welder" and steelworker on the UVSC and Weber State projects. Comtrol has provided 
no explanation for these discrepancies. 
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awarded lower amounts reflecting "a reasonable fair market amount to complete Traco's 
work." (Finding of Fact Nos. 24, 45, R. at 905-06, 912.) 
As mentioned in Traco's opening brief, however, the fair market value of 
Comtrol's labor and materials is not the correct measure of Comtrol's damages. 
Comtrol's damages should have been calculated with reference to actual costs, limited 
appropriately by standards of reasonableness. See Darger v. Nielsen, 605 P.2d 1223, 
1225 (Utah 1979). 
Since trial courts are in the best position to determine the damages that will make 
the parties whole, Kilpatrick v. Wiley Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, \ 72, 37 P.3d 1130, 
Comtrol's alternative calculations of damages on appeal using asserted average hourly 
rates (see Respondent's Brief at 26-27) should be disregarded. This Court should reverse 
and remand so the appropriate method of measuring damages may be applied, with 
damages correctly calculated from there.2 
Comtrol essentially asks this Court to affirm the court of appeals5s 
acceptance of the award of "reasonable fair market amounts" as a rough substitute for 
actual costs, reasonably incurred. However, the trial court clearly started its damages 
analysis with the wrong method for measuring Comtrol's costs—which produced an 
unreasonably high damages figure—and the record provides no clear guidance as to the 
magnitude of each of the excessive items the court deducted in arriving at reasonable fair 
market amounts. The reasonable fair market amounts could very well be excessive since 
the starting point was excessive. To preserve the consistency of Utah law—as well as for 
fairness to the parties—this Court should ensure that the correct damages measure is 
applied in the first instance, allowing the trial court then to make appropriate reductions 
based on all of the evidence. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD DETERMINE THE PREVAILING PARTY 
ON REMAND. 
Comtrol asserts that it would still be the prevailing party even if, on remand, Traco 
were to receive a net judgment on the UVSC and Weber State projects. The thrust of 
Traco's opening brief was merely that Comtrol received a windfall recovery—that is, 
more than it was entitled to—because the trial court used the wrong method for 
measuring Comtrol's damages. 
Of course, on remand it would be the trial court's exclusive province to determine 
the correct amount of damages. It would also be the trial court's exclusive province to 
determine the prevailing party, even under the flexible and reasoned approach of A.K. & 
R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, 94 P.3d 270, and similar cases. 
This Court should disregard Comtrol's assertion that it would remain the prevailing party 
on remand.3 
Moreover, Comtrol misreads the Whipple case, asserting that Comtrol should be 
the prevailing party because it has "prevailed at every juncture of the litigation." 
Traco's opening brief attributed the small net judgment for Comtrol to the 
trial court's incorrect method of measuring damages, demonstrating that Traco would 
have received a net judgment if the correct method had been used. In doing so, Traco 
mistakenly asserted that it would have been the prevailing party if the correct method had 
been used. (See Traco's opening brief at 20.) Recognizing the trial court on remand 
should use a flexible and reasoned approach to determine the prevailing party, Traco 
contends only that it may be the prevailing party on remand. Traco should be given the 
opportunity to show by appropriate evidence that it is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
after the parties' respective damages are determined by the correct legal standard. 
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(Respondent's Brief at 31.) Whipple and its progeny look to "the significance of the net 
judgment" as a starting point, with additional perspectives focused on determining 
comparative victory, considering "the amounts actually sought and then balancing them 
proportionally with what was recovered." Whipple, 2004 UT 47, ffi[ 11-13, 26, 94 P.3d 
270. Contrary to Comtrol's assertion, there is no basis for comparing the results of 
interim battles, such as rulings on whether Traco was justified in abandoning a particular 
project, in determining the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Traco's opening brief, Traco respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the decision of the court of appeals with respect to 
Comtrol's damages, and remand this case to the court of appeals with directions to 
remand to the district court for a determination of the correct measure and amount of 
damages consistent with the Court's ruling. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of August, 2008. 
Stephen B. Doxey 
Attorney for Petitioner Traco Steel Erectors, 
Inc. 
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